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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp. 1990). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is based upon an order entered by the 
honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge, Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, dismissing 
plaintiff/appellants complaint. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether plaintiffs/appellants have a recognizable 
interest in defendant's/appellee's child to permit 
intervention for adoption proceedings or grandparent 
visitation rights. 
I. Whether defendant's child was at any time 
parentless. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated §78-30-4(1)(2) (Set fort in its entirety 
in the Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 26, 1989, the appellee gave birth to a baby 
girl. (R. at 103). The father of the child is David V. 
Kasper, son of plaintiff/appellants. On June 17, 1989, David 
V. Kasper, the father of the child, was killed in an 
automobile accident. David V. Kasper and appellee were not 
married at the time of his death. However, wedding 
announcements were had been printed prior to David V. 
Rasper's death. On or about September 26, 1989, appellant 
filed a complaint with the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, requesting grandparental rights. (R. at 1). On 
September 27, 1989, appellee executed an affidavit and 
release, relinquishing her child to L.D.S. Social Services, a 
licensed child placement agency, for adoptive placement. The 
child has since been placed by L.D.S. Social Services in an 
adoptive home. (R. at 103) Appellee filed a motion to 
dismiss on or about October 10, 1989. (R. at 6). Both 
parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities and 
upon entertaining oral arguments, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
took the matter under advisement and orally requested further 
research and memoranda on the issue of whether or not the 
subject child was ever "parentless." (R. at 80). Having 
considered the memoranda and matters outside the pleadings, 
and pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Judge Christensen granted appellee's motion and 
dismissed the case with prejudice on May 8, 1990, (R. at 106) 
stating that the child was at no time parentless. (R. at 
104). The appellant's, Ruby L. Kasper and David Kasper, 
appeal from the decision of the trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss the complaint by basing its decision on one very 
narrow issue: whether the child was at any time parentless. 
Plaintiff/appellant believes that the child was at one time 
parentless. Defendant gave up all rights, duties and 
privileges to her child. She signed an affidavit terminating 
all of her rights and privileges for the said child and the 
child was relinquished to a child placement agency. 
When cafses such as the case at hand arise involving the 
future of a child, the trial court should consider both 
equity and points of law in making its decision. In this 
case, it appears that the Court did not take into 
consideration one very important fact: that appellants are 
the grandparents of the subject child. This one important 
fact guarantees appellant at the minimum an interest in the 
custody and welfare of child or an inchoate right in the 
custody and welfare of the child. The trial court completely 
ignored this right and interest that grandparents have and 
dismissed the case. This case should not have been dismissed 
and appellant's should have been granted a hearing on their 
fitness as potential adoptive parents. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellants believe that the trial court erred in 
granting defendant's Motion to Dismiss the complaint. The 
Court failed to recognize the most important fact of the 
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case, which is that the plaintiffs/appellants are the 
grandparents of the subject child of this matter. 
Appellant's believe that according to Utah statutes, case law 
and since the trial court recognized that appellants are the 
grandparents of the child, that appellants do have a right to 
a hearing regarding their fitness as adoptive parents, or at 
least whether they may exercise visitation rights with the 
child. 
A. APPELLANTS SHOULD BE GRANTED THE RIGHT TO A 
HEARING BASED ON UTAH CASE LAW AND THE 
UNUSUAL FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
According to the record in this case, the trial court 
recognized that appellants are the,grandparents of the child 
born to appellee. However, the trial court failed to 
recognize any right that appellants have regarding their 
grandchild. This is contrary to established Utah case law on 
the issue of grandparental rights. In Wilson v. Family 
Services Div.r Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976), the 
Supreme Court stated that grandparents do have an interest 
and a right in the custody and welfare of their grandchild 
under certain circumstances. Specifically, a grandparent has 
a "dormant" or "inchoate right or interest" in the welfare or 
custody of a child who becomes "parentless." See also, State 
In Interest of Tom, 556 P.2d 213 (Utah 1976); State in 
Interest of Summers v, Wulffenstein, 571 p.2d 1319 (Utah 
1977); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 588 (Utah App. 1988). If a 
child is considered parentless then the grandparents may 
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exercise their right and assert their claim. Wilson at 231. 
However, contrary to Wilson,, the Trial Court stated that the 
child was never parentless at any time and appellant's claim 
was dismissed. 
The Court's decision appears to be based solely on 
Wilson. In Wilson the mother of the subject child was before 
the court on charges of neglect. During the proceedings, the 
mother "agreed to surrender and disclaim all rights" to the 
child. The court did not terminate or sever the mother's 
rights but father she voluntarxly gave up her rights to the 
child. The court then placed the child with Family Services 
for adoption. The mother's rights were never severed by the 
court and the child was deemed by the Wilson court to be 
parentless. Appellants believe that Wilson is very similar 
to the case at hand. In Wilson and in this case, the rights 
to the child were voluntarily terminated. However, the trial 
court in the instant action distinguishes this case from 
Wilson. The Court failed to give any reason or basis for its 
decision of not deeming the child parentless other than the 
Wilson case. The appellants believe that since appellee gave 
up all rights to the custody of the child by signing an 
affidavit releasing her rights, that the child was in fact 
parentless while it was in the custody of the child placing 
agency. 
By any definition of the word "parent", a child 
placement agency could not be considered a "parent." An 
agency's purpose is to place children with adoptive parents. 
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In other words, the agency is to find suitable adoptive 
parents for a child, not to be the parent itself. The agency 
is not a substitute, surrogate or any other artificial 
parent, but is rather a weigh station between the time the 
child is with its natural parent and the time the child is 
placed with an adoptive parent. This appears to be the case 
whether the parents rights were voluntarily or involuntarily 
terminated, and/or the agency is a private or state funded 
agency. In State In Interest of Summers v. Wulffenstein the 
court referring to Wilson stated that "the administrative 
agency should give serious consideration to the grandparent's 
claim, and that failing, the court concerned with the welfare 
of the child, should accord the grandparent a hearing and 
determination on the merits of the petition." State In 
Interest of Summers v. Wulffenstein at 1322. 
Appellants are sympathetic to the appellee's wishes to 
forget a painful time in her life. However, the thought of 
losing their grandchild to an unknown couple and never being 
a part of their grandchild's life is equally if not more 
painful to them. As much as appellee wishes to control the 
future of her child, by law, the natural parent and the 
agency have no legal right to grant custody, id. The 
granting of custody is a judicial proceeding in which, if an 
agency is involved, must consent to. U.C.A. §78-30-4 (1) (2) . 
It must be noted that once a child is placed with an agency 
and the parents, if living, voluntarily release their rights 
of custody and welfare in the child, then the parents are not 
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required to consent to the adoption. The decision of 
choosing an adoptive family is then the responsibility of the 
agency. Appellants believe that the wishes of the natural 
parent as to who the child is placed with are relevant only 
to any relationship between the the agency and the natural 
parent. The wishes of the natural parent are irrelevant in 
terms of the rights of others, specifically the grandparents, 
and those who actually get custody of the child. 
B. WH^N A PARENT RELEASES CONTROL OF THE CHILD 
TO AN ADOPTION AGENCY, THE PARENT LOSES ALL 
OF HIS/HER RIGHTS IN THE CHILD 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(1) states in relevant part: 
A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each 
living parent having rights in relation to said child, 
except . . . whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have 
theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their 
control, custody, and all parental rights and interests 
in such child to any agency licensed or authorized by 
statute to receive children for placement or adoption in 
any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency 
has in turn, in writing, released its control and 
custody of such child to any agency licensed under 
Chapter 8a Title 55, or to any person, or persons, 
selected by that agency licensed under Utah law, as 
adoptive parents for said child, and such Utah agency 
consents, in writing, to such adoption. (emphasis 
added.) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(2) further states: 
A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the 
adoption of such parent's child, and a minor parent 
shall have the power to release such parent's control or 
custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to 
receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 
8 ["Chapter 8a1, Title 55, and, such a consent or release 
so executed shall b e valid and have the same force and 
effect as a consent or release executed by an adult 
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parent. A minor parent, having so executed a release or 
consent, cannot revoke the same upon such parent's 
attaining the age of majority. (emphasis added.) 
It appears from the language of the above statutes that 
when a parent, whether a minor or not, releases the child for 
adoption through an approved adoption agency, that parent's 
control custody and rights to the child are terminated when 
the parent releases the child and the agency accepts the 
child to be placed for adoption, not when the child is 
actually adopted. Appellants believe that the adoption does 
not have to take place for the parental rights of the 
consenting parent to be terminated. From the language of the 
statute it appears that once the parent releases the child to 
an agency the parent cannot revoke'the release and have the 
child returned to him or her. In other words, a voluntary 
release of custody and parental rights has the same legal 
effect as the court severing parental rights. It is thereby 
the duty of the agency to consent to the adoption, when the 
adoption takes place, not the right or duty of the parents to 
consent. It is not disputed that appellee properly released 
the child to a licensed child placing and adoption agency. 
It is also not disputed that the said agency received and 
consented to the release of the child. Therefore, under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4 (1), (2) it appears that appellee had 
all rights terminated when she properly released the child to 
the adoption agency and when the agency consented to the 
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release. This reasoning is consistent with Wilson and the 
child should be deemed parentless. 
Appellant therefore believes that the decision of the 
trial court was arbitrary in that there is no rational basis 
for the child being deemed parentless. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the above cited Utah Statutes, case law, 
since appellants are in fact the grandparents of the child, 
and appellants believe that the child was parentless, 
appellants believe that they do have a right and interest in 
the custody and welfare of the child. Therefore, since they 
timely intervened into the adoption proceedings, they should 
be granted a hearing regarding their fitness as adoptive 
parents. 
DATED this day of November, 1990. 
Michael J. Petro 
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ADDENDUM 
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78-30-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Reviews. — Comment, The Utah Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitu- § 10. 
tion, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319. C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 13. 
Key Numbers. — Adoption «=» 4. 
78-30-3. Adoption by married persons. 
A married man, not lawfully separated from his wife, cannot adopt a child 
without the consent of his wife, nor can a married woman, not thus separated 
from her husband, adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consent-
ing is capable of giving such consent. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 3; C.L. 
1917, § 12; L. 1919, ch. 1, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 14-1-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 14. 
§ 41. Key Numbers. — Adoption «=> 7. 
78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or,whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
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